Index IntroductionThe balance of power and the First World WarConclusionIntroductionBefore the 20th century, Great Britain had opted for a position of isolationism towards other European powers, without formal alliances, allowed them to maneuver among other nations without being drawn into conflicts. Therefore, it once seemed unlikely that Britain could become a player if war broke out across Europe. Yet in the summer of 1914 the British government made the decision to go to war, scholars continue to debate why this decision was made more than 100 years after the outbreak of war. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay The Balance of Power and the First World War British foreign policy sought to achieve a balance of power across Europe before the First World War, hoping that no one country could dominate the continent. Many believe that by maintaining this balance, war could be prevented by deterring potential attackers. However, the unification of Germany in 1871 upset this balance as the country's economic strength proliferated and foreign policy under Kaiser Wilhelm II, who wanted to further elevate Germany's position, began to challenge that status quo which led neighboring countries to protect themselves with alliances with the Franco-Russian alliance signed in 1894. With this alliance signed, two blocks of competing alliances were now formed, with Russia and France on one side and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. Until the late 1890s, the British government had refused to ally itself with other nations, opting instead for “splendid isolation.” Imperialists argued that a great empire and overseas navy would safeguard Britain; this argument failed after the Boer War highlighted the weakness of the British war machine and the problems this posed for the British Empire. With the formation of the alliances mentioned, the British government now realized that Britain was left exposed in isolation with a small army and no friendly alliances. Before 1906, the most significant threat was considered Russia. So, in weighing the options, the British government had to consider the threat of a victorious Russia with an ally of France in a potential war. Britain was looking for an ally that would not involve excessive commitments. As Anglo-German tensions increased, Britain began to look towards their old enemy, France, and the Entente Cordiale was signed in 1904, but it did not carry an official military obligation. Sir Edward Gray had feared that turning the agreement into an official alliance might give France and Russia the initiative to declare war. So it can be seen as a careful diplomatic balancing aimed at restraining both countries and at the same time deterring Germany. A balance of power between the two alliance blocs should in theory strengthen deterrence as neither side can see a clear victory. However the problem was that both sides could imagine that victory would lead to both wanting to act before the balance shifted in their favor. Steiner and Neilson in their book "Britain and the Origins of the First World War" argued that if Germany had really intended to tip the balance of power in their favor, without a strong coalition of powers to stop them victory would have been was possible. Therefore, although Britain had no military obligations to provideaid to France and Russia, the British government may have come to the conclusion that the only way to maintain the balance of power was to go to war in 1914 to provide additional power against Germany. The British would also have relied on these Entente Powers to fight a land war as with only a small army compared to the other European powers, Britain relied heavily on its naval power to exert control. Britain felt that the balance of power was further threatened with Germany's ambition to expand its naval fleet from 1897 onwards. British naval dominance was based on having a navy significant enough to withstand any threat from two combined European powers. Germany already had the major military force, but Britain believed that the combined powers of Russia and France could counterbalance it, thus dissuading Germany from conflict and maintaining the status quo throughout Europe. With a growing naval fleet, the balance would tip in Germany's favour, increasing fears about Britain's position as a world power and threatening their internal defence. The British government believed that the only appropriate response to the naval plan was to engage in a naval arms race to maintain the balance and safeguard itself. This competition further aggravated Anglo-German relations. There were attempts to mend ties between the two countries in 1912 with the feat of the Haldane mission; the hope was to end the naval arms race. The German government agreed to suspend shipbuilding under conditions of British neutrality in the event of a European conflict. For the British government this was too great a concession since its maritime supremacy was intended to intervene against disturbances in the balance of power. The failure to deal only worsened relations and helped develop Germany's image as a threat to Britain's world standing. There were growing fears that Germany might seek European dominance, not unlike Napoleon in the early 19th century and achieving this dominance would allow them to overtake the British navy and use continental ports leading to dominance of the seas, thus we can see a clear connection between Britain's naval power and the government's desire to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Until early August, the British government was divided over how to deal with the ongoing crisis in Europe, with many believing that Britain should remain neutral. Between 30 July and 2 August, Liberal MP Charles Honhouse highlighted the many conflicting opinions within parliament, stating that "The Prime Minister, Haldane and I are in favor of war if there was even a merely technical violation of the treaty with Belgium". Unlike alliances with France and Russia, Britain had military obligations under the 1839 treaty with Belgium, which guaranteed its neutrality. Germany felt trapped between France and Russia and its greatest concern was facing a war on two fronts; it was decided that the best way to achieve a quick victory against France would be through Belgium. As Margaret Macmillan pointed out in "The War that Ended the Peace," this decision would not only have dampened Germany's reputation, but would have threatened to bring Britain into a war in which it was originally decisive whether or not to enter. The British government argued that the decision to go to war in 1914 was to maintain the treaty with Belgium and defend its.