In the UK today, no issue of public interest seems to be as widely and hotly debated as that of terrorism. When people hear about terrorist attacks, they react with horror and disgust (rightly so), however, few discussions ever revolve around the question of whether terrorism can ever be justified. In his book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer lays the foundations of the circumstances under which terrorism can be morally justified in what he calls the “supreme emergency” situation. This essay aims to critically analyze Walzer's concept of “supreme emergency” and his efforts to integrate it into the ordinary constraints of jus in bello in line with the just war tradition. First, this essay will attempt to define what terrorism actually is before moving on to discuss the supreme emergency situation and the arguments supporting this permissibility to violate the jus in bello rules. This essay will therefore discuss the inherent limitations of this concept and scholars' arguments against Walzer. Finally, this essay will ask whether the concept of supreme emergency can only apply to state actors and not to non-state actors before concluding that, unless one adheres to moral absolutism, in a situation of supreme emergency terrorism can be justified. One of the problems faced when dealing with terrorism is that there is no universally agreed upon definition. Valls notes that there is a division between political actors and scholars in the definition of terrorism. This is because the word terrorism is used by politicians as a political weapon with the aim of painting their opponents as monsters, while scholars try to define what captures the essence of terrorism. Valls also says he agrees with Teichman's views on terrorism, who writes that "we shouldn't start by defining terrorism as a bad thing." By defining terrorism as intrinsically wrong and unjustifiable, according to Valls (2000), the substantive moral question is undermined through a consideration by definition. This may seem paradoxical, however, later in this essay we will discuss how this is relevant to justifying the concept of supreme emergence. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Another problem with the definition of terrorism is due to the lack of agreement on who can commit terrorism. In their famous song about IRA hunger striker Joe McDonnell, the Wolfe Tones wrote: "And you want to call me a terrorist, while you looked down on your gun" in reference to the British Army, which, like the IRA, committed acts that many would condemn as terrorism. There is no clear consensus on who the perpetrators of terrorism might be. For example, the US government's definition of terrorism excludes state actors and has been criticized for this. Igor Primoratz, on the contrary, argues that “terrorism cannot be based on the identity of those who resort to it and must therefore be extended to include 'state terrorism'” (Primotatz, 2007, p.33). This is because, as he argues, states have been among the major actors in terrorism. For the purposes of this essay, we will use Rodin's definition of terrorism as "the deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against non-combatants, by state and non-state actors, for ideological purposes and in the absence of substantial legal process right" (Rodin, 2004, p.754). This allows us to critique the concept of both state and non-state terrorism. Just war theory is a highly articulated paradigmand widely used to analyze the morality of international relations, especially war. Stevens argues that just war theory can be applied to other forms of violence, including terrorism. Like war, he believes that “terrorism can be a strategic decision, following a deliberate cost-benefit analysis, to engage in violent struggle to redress past grievances or improve current conditions.” While the killing of non-combatants has long been considered a fundamental principle of the conduct of war that should not be violated. It has been argued that under extreme conditions, innocent non-combatant civilians may be targeted. Michael Walzer, otherwise a strict advocate of jus in bello conditions in war, argues that under conditions of extreme emergency, a state can rightly ignore the moral principles and rules of the just war tradition and deliberately target enemy civilians, if certain circumstances occur. In line with Rodin's (2004) definition of terrorism, a supreme emergency is therefore an act of state terrorism as it targets non-combatants in times of war. A supreme emergency, according to Walzer, constitutes “…an extreme threat to all that is dignified in our lives, an ideology and practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its victory final were literally incalculable." , immeasurably terrible” (Walzer, 2015, p.253). For a supreme emergency situation to occur, two conditions must be met. First, a state must find itself in imminent threat of danger, with no means to defend itself and with all other options exhausted, and second, the nature of the threat must be as grave as the threat of total destruction of the style of life of the state. and human values ​​both in the present and in the future. Both of these conditions must be met for a state to be morally entitled to target the enemy's civilian population if this is the only remaining military option available. A supreme emergency constitutes a dilemma according to Walzer: it is one in which one must choose between two evils, and one must opt ​​for the lesser one. Therefore, a political leader facing a supreme emergency should choose the “best” alternative, even if that act itself is morally condemnable. Circumstances of supreme emergency are few and far between due to the stringent conditions that must be met for one of them to prevail. the rules of war. However, one example that according to Walzer highlights the case of a truly supreme emergency was the British bombing of German cities such as Dresden during World War II. Walzer considers it a truly supreme emergency, since Britain's decision to drop bombs on German civilians was taken at a time when victory for the Allies was not in sight and the specter of defeat for Nazi Germany was in sight, which would have had disastrous and unimaginable consequences. to the values, way of life and future of Britain, it has always been present. With all other military options exhausted or deemed ineffective, targeted attacks on the German civilian population represented Britain's last resort to turning the tide of the war. Although tragic, Walzer defends Britain's decision to commit an act of terrorism in this case with the following argument: “… a world in which entire peoples are enslaved or massacred is literally unbearable. Because the survival and freedom of political communities are the highest values ​​of international society” (Walzer, 2015, p.254). Walzer further emphasizesthat the supreme emergency argument should strengthen professional ethics and provide an explanation of when it is permissible, or even necessary, to “get your hands dirty.” For Walzer, the possibility of the Nazis invading Britain would be unbearable for the political community, and therefore it would be a total irresponsibility to adhere to a moral rule if the only way to prevent this disaster was to violate those rules. He argues that moral absolutism “represents… a refusal to think about what it means for the heavens to fall. And the history of the 20th century makes this refusal very difficult to justify” (Walzer, 2005, p. 37). Walzer therefore takes a consequentialist approach to the morality of terrorism according to which terrorism, like everything else, should be judged solely by its consequences. And when the rationally foreseen consequences are good, all things considered it will be morally justified. Walzer is right when he states that terrorism can be justified in a tragic condition of supreme emergency. In the case of Britain bombing German cities during the Second World War, this constituted a truly supreme emergency and was morally justified on the basis that the alternative (Nazi occupation of Britain) would have been far more disastrous for many more people. Therefore, terrorism resulting from a supreme emergency situation such as that of Britain during World War II can be justified. Walzer's argument for justifying state terrorism in a supreme emergency situation has attracted much attention and criticism. Many, like Giroux (2015), believe that terrorism of any kind must be denounced without reservation, without allowing for exceptions, be they states, revolutionaries or religious and ideological militants. While others, such as Cook and Coady, do not believe that Walzer's supreme emergency should constitute an art of moral theory of war or political violence, calming the fact that such permission to kill innocent civilians in extreme situations runs the risk of being applied indulgently. However, Walzer clearly states that the principles of just war must not be violated until all other options have been exhausted and that with this the threat of imminence and danger must still be present which would make a lenient application of this concept difficult. Furthermore, Cook, among others, criticizes Walzer for giving too strong a preference to “political community” (Cook, 2007, p.141). Igor Primoratz agrees with Cook's statement by stating that “…while the genocide, explosion or enslavement of an entire people can be a moral disaster that can be avoided by any means, its loss of political independence for a political community is, at best, a political disaster” (Primoratz, 2007, p.19). For Primoratz, the decisive aspect for considering a situation as a supreme emergency is whether there is a threat of genocide, slavery or ethnic cleansing, however, the threat to the "continuity" of a political community is not serious enough to constitute an emergency supreme where terrorism can be a justified recourse. However, regardless of the conditions on which Walzer and Primoratz disagree in relation to a situation of supreme emergency, they both agree that terrorism, in some cases, can be justified. Both Walzer and Primoratz agree that in a supreme emergency, while the act is tragic and to some extent wrong, a political leader is justified in attacking innocent civilians. Orend, however, believes that in a supreme emergency one is "forced to do terrible things to survive" and therefore one can be "excused", but never justified. One might insist thatthe immunity of innocent civilians from attacks is an absolute moral principle that can never be justifiably violated due to the victims' human rights, such as violation of life and integrity, yet Schwenkenbecher (2009) demonstrates that actors do not they are simply excused for killing innocents in an extreme emergency situation, but they are morally obligated to do so. According to Schwenkenbecher, if a political actor has a moral obligation to act in a certain way (e.g., Churchill is obliged to protect British citizens during World War II), then he is morally justified in doing so. Taking a moral absolutist position in a supreme emergency would be completely irresponsible, and if targeting innocents prevented a moral disaster, then it would be morally wrong not to take these appropriate steps (Schewnkenbecher, 2009). As Walzer (2015) states, “utilitarian calculus can force us to violate the rules of war”; taking an absolutist position by obeying moral law in a supreme emergency would be more unjustified than committing an act of terrorism in a supreme emergency itself since the former would have much worse consequences. A final point to consider concerns the perpetrators of terrorism and who may be justified in committing such acts. On the subject of terrorism, Walzer appears to be doubly right when it comes to state and non-state actors. For non-state actors, terrorism is a strategy used that characterizes the deliberate violation of ethical and political norms, and is therefore indefensible and unjust. However, as mentioned above, he also sees (and justifies) the bombing of German cities like Dresden by the British during World War II as an act of “terrorism.” Walzer is therefore inconsistent in his approach to terrorism and Valls (2000) complains that he encodes a “pro-state bias” since his supreme emergency argument is available only to states and their representatives. Furthermore, Coady (1985) states that from a philosophical point of view this double standard cannot be sustained and argues that consistency requires that the same standards be applied to both types of political violence, state and non-state. So can non-state acts of terrorism be justified in the same way as state acts? Valls says yes and argues that, according to the most plausible explanation of just war theory, taking into account the ultimate basis of its criteria, political violence undertaken by non-state actors can, in principle, satisfy the requirements of a just war . According to Walzer, for a supreme emergency to be justified, jus in bello can be disregarded if all other options are exhausted and a disaster for the “political community” is imminent and serious (Walzer, 2015). Political communities, however, are not limited to national states alone. Political communities can be made up of a wide range of groups, including racial, ethnic, and religious groups. For example, according to Walzer's definition of supreme emergency, during World War II the European Jewish community faced a supreme emergency due to the Holocaust. Although European Jewry was not a state, surely a group of Jewish militants would be justified in attacking German civilians if it offered any hope of stopping or minimizing the genocide of their people? Even if it involves a horrible wrongdoing, you have a duty to protect yourself and your community, whether you are a state actor or not (Valls, 2000). In the case of the Holocaust, therefore, in a situation of extreme emergency it would be justified for a non-state actor to target non-combatants. Please note: this is just an example. Get it now. 34: 3–12.