Philosophers have debated the question of the morality of war for centuries and have concluded that there is, in fact, a just war; and a just way to wage war. Jeff McMahan has written about the origins of just war theory and how it is challenged by the changing nature of war. The principles of just wars and just conduct were developed and applied when wars between nation-states took place; but now that armed conflicts rarely pit countries against each other and more often pit opposing factions within a country or region, these principles may no longer be applicable or appropriate. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Enshrined in the principles of the Geneva Convention, such wars must adhere to the following principles: In most presentations of just war theory there are six principles of jus ad bellum (waging just wars), each with its own label: just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, necessity or last resort, proportionality and reasonable hope of success. Jus in bello (behavior in just wars) includes three principles: discrimination, necessity or minimum force and, again, proportionality. These principles articulate in compressed form an understanding of the morality of war that is, in its fundamental structure, much the same as it was 300 years ago. These principles were rarely respected, even in the most innocent era of World War II. The American bombing of Dresden or the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could hardly be called proportional; but obviously the generals who planned these attacks certainly thought so. Curtis LeMay, a senior Air Force officer who advocated annihilation of the enemy through massive aerial bombing, said it best. War is hell, he claimed, saving American lives was the only priority, and all the calculations and equations about Japanese deaths were irrelevant. Bombing the Japanese back to the Stone Age was perfectly right and acceptable because it would shorten the war and stop the killing of American soldiers. His argument, indifferent to the number of Japanese dead, focused only on the morality of the victory and the victor's life saved. For LeMay, "proportionality" had no meaning. Since the value of an American soldier has no equivalent to an enemy force, that is, one can never place value on American life because that life is priceless. Likewise, one could never place value on the lives of the Japanese because they had none. Israel applies the same theory. There is no way to calculate the life of an Israeli soldier because it is priceless; and if the death of 100 or even 1000 Palestinians is necessary to stop the killing of Israeli personnel, so be it. In short, Israel has its own definition of proportionality. “Legitimate authority” has generally been interpreted as a response to an armed attack. A just war would be one in which the aggrieved country has the legitimate right to declare war on the aggressor. There was no doubt, therefore, about the armed response of the Allies to the invasions of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Given this rather simple and direct definition, the principle of “right intention” follows logically. “Reasonable hope of success” seems the least important and relevant, because few countries would embark on a war with little expectation of victory. There is no doubt that American politicians and their generals believed that the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, and theWar of 1812 were simply wars, with clear legitimacy, right intention, and reasonable hope of success. However, a strong argument could be made that these were American wars of aggression designed to consolidate territory, remove the British once and for all from American lands, and extend the horizons of empire. While the Korean War appears to fall into the right war category, as it is commonly believed to have been provoked by the North Koreans, the Vietnam War clearly is not. No one can claim that this war satisfied any of the conditions of the just war theory. What legitimacy did a war for which the casus belli (Gulf of Tonkin) was invented have? How was it legitimate to intervene in what was fundamentally a civil conflict fought for nationalism and not for regional domination? Where was the proportionality in the LeMay-style massive carpet bombing of the North? Where was the reasonable expectation of victory when the United States completely underestimated the strength and resolve of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese? The point is that the just wars debate is an academic exercise with no real relevance. From the aggressor's point of view, all wars are justified. The academic exercise itself becomes more complicated as philosophers try to make sense of today's asymmetric wars. Countries don't fight each other much anymore, but al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, Boko Haram, al-Shaba, and a hundred other armed militias around the world attack ruling regimes or attack each other with increasing regularity . These “wars,” like conflicts between states, are fought over land, resources, power, and perhaps some principle; and there can be no doubt about their perceived legitimacy. The moral question comes when the superpowers must decide whether to intervene or not. Surely there was a just war moral case for the United States to intervene in the Rwandan genocide and declare war on the Hutu; or send expeditionary forces to Sudan to stop the killing in Darfur; or having intervened much earlier in the war in Bosnia. Many argue that by failing to fight a just war, America and its allies have been immoral. Rightness or righteousness must be defined in the context of sins of omission as well as sins of commission. Philosophers are trying to decipher the new rules of engagement and place them in a moral context. Some, like McMahan, want to return to the classical theory that places the burden of responsibility on individuals, rather than states. In the war against terrorism we fight neither states nor armed groups, but individuals who want to harm us for a general cause. Destroying or neutralizing them is necessary to keep the United States safe. Please note: this is just an example. Get a custom paper from our expert writers now. Get a Custom Essay The theory returns, for example, to the idea that it is individual people, not states, who kill and are killed in war, and that it is they, rather than their state, who bear primary responsibility for their participation and action in war. This is counting angels on the head of a pin. We wage war on the briefest and flimsiest of pretensions, and no one seems to really care who is threatening us or how. It is enough to be threatened and take whatever action is necessary to eliminate the threat. Once we go to war, the question of right action arises; and any semblance of niceties of the Geneva Convention have been thrown out the window. Who doubts that an enemy of the United States would hesitate to use chemical or biological weapons? or that we would use strategic nuclear strikes if/