Kant, Velleman and Thomson put together a series of arguments on the question of whether or not it is morally right to offer terminally ill patients the possibility of being helped to die by their doctors or carers and how. From Kant's perspective, morality concerns the relationship between motivations and action. This knowledge of morality comes from reasoning about what might be a law for human action. According to Kant, actions are performed for a reason, the reasons in turn are general and apply to all rational creatures. However, we don't need reasons, reason only commands us. A command or imperative suggests what we should do, but it is also something we may not do. Kant sees this as the gap between recognizing that something is right and actually putting it into practice. Kant claims to be an autonomist, and “Autonomy is […] the foundation of human nature and of every rational nature.” (Kant, 4:436). Although both Thomson and Velleman agree that people's autonomy should be treated with respect, they both interpret this to reach conclusions that not only differ from Kant's view, but also have very different consequences from each other. 'other. On the one hand, Velleman argues that respect for people's autonomy does not oblige us to make euthanasia a protected option, formally foreseen and over which the patient has exclusive authority. While on the other side of the issue Thomson argues that respect for people's autonomy requires it. After briefly stating each argument, I will defend Thomson's argument by objecting that Velleman's view of giving the patient the right to die is not so much giving the patient a new option as simply restoring an option lost due to the state of the patient. his life. condition.Kant's argument... half of the article... following this logic, one might extend it to suggest that by giving an incapacitated patient the right to die we are not giving him a new option whatsoever. In this circumstance it appears rationally that we are restoring a previously held right to a lost option for the state of their condition. After all, if Velleman truly maintains his logic that “our ability to justify our choices to the people around us is what allows us to sustain the role of rational agent in our relationships with them; and it is therefore essential for us to remain, in their eyes, a suitable partner in cooperation and conversation, or an appropriate object of respect” (Velleman, p. 11), who as a rational agent must follow his own logic as we have done. set forth in our objection and thus personifying why I am more inclined to side with Thomson's thesis.