The relationship between religion and morality has been, and continues to be, exhaustively discussed and debated by philosophers. One topic that seeks to provide a solution to this controversial question is Divine Command Theory. In this article I will argue that the reasoning provided by Divine Command Theory is an inadequate defense of morality's dependence on religion and religious deities because it fails to provide a logical justification for God's moral dictates. First, I will begin by providing an examination more attentive to Divine Command Theory and its implications, and I will offer an explanation for its widespread appeal. Next, I will present Plato's Euthyphro, which criticizes the Divine Command Theory's definition of morality, and his famous dilemma, which poses two possible explanations for the correlation between God's command and morality. Next, I will explore Rachels' argument in Elements of Moral Philosophy, which assumes that neither of the two alternatives proposed by Euthyphro's dilemma is acceptable because the first fails to provide a reason for God's moral judgments, implying that they are arbitrary, while the second is inconsistent with religious ideology. Next, I will examine and refute a counterargument made by many atheists… Finally, I will conclude that due to the failure of Divine Command Theory to demonstrate the dependence of morality on the will of God, independent moral standards do in fact exist. In order to criticize Divine Command Theory, it is important to first understand it. According to the theory, morality is defined solely by the will of God and there are no moral standards independent of His will. It is simple and unambiguous; once accepted, issues such as the moral relationship... at the heart of the card... and therefore Divine Command Theory were found to be inadequate in this case. Furthermore, accepting this alternative requires blind obedience, a condition that cannot be accepted by a critically thinking mind. In the Euthyphro, Socrates makes a distinction between two types of love; teofili, which “is such as to be loved because it is loved”, and osion, which is “loved because it is such as to be loved”. (The Euthyphro) The first is representative of his first, unsatisfactory alternative, and the second is his second; however, this is also problematic. It avoids the fatal flaw of the original alternative by proposing that accepting God's definition of morality is acceptable because God is omniscient, observes that certain actions are more desirable than others, and subsequently commands us to follow these standards to our advantage..